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Abstract
I construct a model of the monetary economy, in which different assets provide liq-
uidity services. Assets differ in terms of the liquidity services they provide, and money
is the most liquid asset. The central bank can implement policies by changing the
relative supply of money and other assets. I show that the central bank can change the
overall liquidity and welfare of the economy by changing the relative supply of assets
with different liquidity characteristics. A liquidity trap exists away from the Fried-
man rule that has a positive real interest rate; the central bank’s asset purchase/sale
programs may be ineffective in instances of low enough inflation rates. My model also
enables me to study the welfare effects of a restriction on trade with government bonds.
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1 Introduction
Central banks’ asset purchase programs involve purchasing assets and paying with assets
that are different in terms of the liquidity services they provide. The liquidity characteris-
tics of the central banks’ and households balance sheets are affected by this practice. To
investigate the liquidity effects of these policies, I construct a microfounded model of mon-
etary economy where households can trade goods with different types of assets. I use the
theoretical model to show that within a specific set of parameters, open-market operations
may affect the decision of households in the economy and welfare. In these cases, the central
bank can affect the amount of produced goods in the economy by trading illiquid assets with
money. There is an optimum supply of bonds that maximizes welfare in the economy. In an
economy with two types of government-issued assets with different liquidity characteristics,
the central bank is able to use open-market operations to change the liquidity characteristics
of agents’ portfolios. The central bank’s asset purchase/sale programs can improve welfare
by increasing (decreasing) liquidity in periods of low (high) liquidity.
During the period 2008 − 2011 many central banks implemented a series of unconven-
tional monetary policies in response to the financial crisis. A major part of these policies was
the large-scale asset purchase programs (known as quantitative easing). The Bank of Japan
implemented similar policies from 2000 − 2006. These programs are basically open-market
operations that change the size or the composition of central banks’ balance sheets. Similarly,
the Fed implemented two sets of policies in response to the financial crisis: 1-Quantitative
easing: expanding the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet by purchasing con-
ventional assets1 and issuing reserves on the liability side. 2-Credit easing: changing the
composition of the Fed’s balance sheet by selling conventional assets and buying unconven-
tional assets2. While academics discuss several channels through which these policies can
affect the real economy (e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)), policy makers
(e.g. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004)) mainly highlight two: 1-Signaling lower interest rate
in the long-term. 2-Increasing demand for other assets in the economy and decreasing yield
on these assets3.
The literature on open-market operations and quantitative easing falls into two cate-
gories. First, there are earlier papers that show open-market operations are irrelevant for the
real economy. Wallace (1981) uses a Modigliani-Miller4 argument to show that open-market
1In the US this mainly takes the form of treasuries, and in Canada this mainly takes the form of bonds,
term purchase, and resale agreements for the private sector
2Credit easing is also called an asset sterilizing program or Operation Twist
3Agents rebalanced their portfolios towards other assets in the economy
4As in Modigliani and Miller (1958)
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operations are irrelevant. Many papers follow Wallace (1981) and show that open-market op-
erations do not affect the real economy. In these models assets are perfectly substitutable in
terms of liquidity services, and open-market operations do not change the liquidity character-
istics of households asset portfolios. In a model with liquid bonds, since bonds and money
are perfectly substitutable, households have a similar liquidity preference towars holding
bonds and money. Households cannot use bonds to affect the liquidity characteristics of
their portfolios.
Second, papers show that open-market operations can affect the real economy. In a model
in which interest bearing assets provide different liquidity services compared to money, open-
market operations change the liquidity characteristics of households’ portfolios and have real
effects on the economy. Kocherlakota (2003) uses a similar argument and shows that in a
centralized market, agents use illiquid bonds to smooth consumption. Andres et al. (2004)
study portfolio rebalancing channel by building a New-Kaynsian model of the monetary
economy. Curdia and Woodford (2010) study the effects of size of central banks’ balance
sheets in a New-Keynesian model. They find out that if we do not take into account the
signaling channel, pure open-market operations have no real effects. Auerbach and Obstfeld
(2005) study the replacement of interest-bearing government debt with non-interest-bearing
currency or reserves on central bank’s balance sheets and find out that quantitative easing
has real effects. While these papers answer some of the questions concerning open-market
operations, they do not discuss the liquidity channel and they use reduced form models (e.g.,
money in the utility function and sticky prices). Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) study a model of
monetary economy with differences in liquidity across assets. They show that open-market
operations are effective when the central bank purchases the assets with partial resaleability
and a substantial liquidity premium during negative liquidity shocks. The illiquid asset in
their model are mainly capital and securities that are issued based on capital, and their
analysis focuses on the role of open-market operations on privately provided liquidity.
I expand the existing literature on the effects of open-market operations by building a
micro-founded model of monetary economy. The basic model is a variation of Shi (2008),
who uses a similar framework to study the legal restrictions on trade with nominal bonds.
Agents can trade with different government-issued assets that provide different liquidity
services. Contrary to Shi (2008), here the argument is not based on parameters in the utility
function. Shi (2008) assumes that agents can use bonds to trade certain types of goods that
yield a higher utility when consumed. Here, consumption of different goods yield the same
amount of utility and my analysis hinges on the liquidity characteristics of assets. Assets
are different in terms of the liquidity services they provide. Central bank’s open-market
purchase of assets increases liquidity in the economy by injecting money and purchasing
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interest-bearing assets.
How does this model investigate the liquidity effects of central banks policies? First, I
use a household structure, which helps to build a tractable model that avoids the evolving
distribution of asset holding. In this structure, households do not face any intertemporal
uncertainty. Therefore, there is no precautionary motive for saving. Households buy assets
only for the liquidity services they provide. The yield on assets is a pure liquidity premium.
Second, I model liquidity services provided by assets. Households do not gain utility by
holding assets. This allows me to investigate the effects of different central policies on the
liquidity premium on assets and the overall welfare in the economy.
In the literature on monetary economics and policy liquidity traps are mostly associated
with the Friedman rule5. Williamson (2011) studies liquidity trap in cases where the economy
is away from the Friedman rule and when the real interest rate is zero. He discusses the
liquidity channel of open-market operations in a model with public and private liquidity in
which it is costly to operate a monetary system. In this paper, we can have the properties of
the liquidity trap equilibrium when the real interest rate is positive. In this case, marginal
open-market operations do not have real effects on the economy. In an extension of the
model with three assets I show that a policy of credit easing can affect welfare.
In section 2, I develop a micro-founded model of the monetary economy. I then study
the optimal choices and discuss different equilibria and welfare effects of different policies.
In section 3, I study the model with two types of government issued assets. Section 4 offers
concluding remarks and possible extensions.
2 Model environment
2.1 Households
Time is discrete, and there are different types of households (H ≥ 3). Each household
consumes a good that is produced by some other type of household, type h household
consumes good h but produces good h + 1. There is no double coincidence of wants, and
goods are perishable. Each household consists of a large number of members (measure
one). There is perfect consumption insurance between household members; members of a
household share consumption and regard utility of the household as the common objective6.
Each household divides its members into three groups: sellers/producers (measure σ),
buyers (measure n− σ), and leisure seekers (measure 1− n). Households choose n, and σ is
5Money grows at the rate that agents discount future consumption
6The large household structure and the assumptions of perfect consumption insurance make the distri-
bution of assets among agents degenerate.
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fixed7.
2.2 Markets and matching
There are two markets in this economy, a centralized market for assets and a decentralized
market for goods. Money and bond are supplied by the central bank. The central bank
implements policies by printing money at rate γ and changing the relative composition of
the stock of bond and money in the economy. In the centralized market for assets, government
bond is sold for money. In the decentralized market for goods, search frictions exist. Buyers
and sellers of different households are randomly matched in pairs. The number of matches
for each household is αN , where α is a parameter of the environment and N is the aggregate
number of traders in the market. Lower case letters are choices of the household under
consideration and capital letters are per capita variables that individual households cannot
affect. According to this matching technology, the matching rate for buyers is αN
N−σ and the
matching rate for the sellers is αN
σ
8. The matching process of a three household economy is
shown in figure 1. Because of the assumed structure of the environment, a successful match
is between buyers of household “h” and sellers of household “h+ 1.”
B
S
L
B
S
L
B
S
L
Figure 1: Matching process in a 3 household economy
7This assumption is for simplicity. I can allow households to choose σ and the main results hold
8I assume α is low enough that matching rates are less than 1
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2.3 Trade
In the centralized market for assets, households trade government bond for money. In the
decentralized market for goods, household members trade goods for money or government
bond. Trade history is private information, therefore there is no credit. After household
members are matched, a matching shock determines the type of assets they can use for
trade. With probability 1 − l, they can only use money (this trade is indexed by “m”) to
purchase goods, and with probability l they can use both money and bond (this trade is
indexed by “b”) to purchase goods9.
2.4 Timing
The timing of the events is shown in figure 2.
t t+1Government:
• transfers
• prints money
• redeems
bonds
• issues bonds
Asset market
Asset portfolio
(m, b)
Choices:
n, (xi, qi)
Frictional market
Matching shocks
Trade in goods Consumption
Figure 2: Timing
At the beginning of each period, the asset market opens. Households redeem nominal
bonds from the previous period for 1 unit of money, trade assets for money, receive transfer
T , and adjust their portfolios to (m, b). The asset market is closed until the beginning of the
next period. Households choose the amount of total traders n and give buyers instructions
on how to trade in different types of trade (Goods: qi, assets: xi, i ∈ {m, b}). Buyers and
sellers search in the goods market and match according to the linear matching function.
Matched sellers produce and trade and then bring goods and assets back to the household
and members of the household share consumption.
9Different types of matches can be interpreted as “monitored” and “non-monitored” matches as in
Williamson (2011).
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The representative household solves the following maximization problem
v(m, b) = max
ci,qi,xi,n,m+1,b+1,
{u(cm)− αN(1− l)ψ(Qm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Money trade
+ u(cb)− αNlψ(Qb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Money+bond trade
+h(1− n) + βv(m+1, b+1)} (1)
Households choose the consumption, terms of trade, number of traders, and asset portfolio
for the next period to maximize the above value function. The utility from trade is the sum
of the net utility in each type of trade. In each trade, household shares the utility from
consumption of the purchased goods and the cost of production of the sold goods10. u() is
continuous and twice differentiable, and u′() > 0, u′′() < 0. I assume ψ′() > 0, ψ′′() > 0;
h′() > 0 and h′′() < 0. Goods are divisible and perishable. Consumption in each type of
trade is the matching rate times the total amount of goods bought by the buyers in that
trade
cb =
αN
(N − σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Matching rate
(n− σ)lqb
cm =
αN(n− σ)(1− l)
(N − σ) qm
In each type of trade, buyers are constrained by the portfolio of assets that they have.
In a money trade, buyers are constrained by the amount of money they have
xm ≤ m
n− σ (2)
In a money and bond trade, buyers are constrained by the total portfolio of assets they
carry
xb ≤ m+ b
n− σ (3)
Lets define ωi, i ∈ {m, b} as the marginal value of assets
ωm =
β
γ
∂v(m, b)
∂m+1
ωb =
β
γ
∂v(m, b)
∂b
10Since buyers have all the bargaining power, the amount sold is shown by capital letters Qi.
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Ωm is the per capita value of money in the economy. In each trade, sellers sell goods for
a portfolio of assets, which has a marginal value of Ωm. Seller’s surplus is xiΩm−ψ(qi) i ∈
{m, b}. Since buyers have all the bargaining power, the offer sets sellers’ surplus to 0. Thus,
the participation constraint is
xi = ψ(qi)/Ωm i ∈ {m, b} (4)
Households face the following law of motion for assets
(m+1 + s+1b+1 + T+1)γ =
m+ b+ αNlXb + αN(1− l)Xm︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sellers’ assets
− αN(n− σ)
N − σ lx
b − αN(n− σ)
N − σ (1− l)x
m︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buyers’ assets
(5)
Money balance plus the amount spent on the assets in the next period and the tax
(/transfers) is equal to the portfolio of assets in the current period plus the assets that the
sellers bring back minus the assets that buyers have spent on their purchases of goods.
2.5 Optimal choices
The first order condition for qi is
u′(ci) = (ωm + λi)
ψ′(qi)
Ω
i ∈ {b,m} (6)
I can solve for bond prices by taking the first order conditions with respect to b
b+1 : s+1 =
ωb
ωm
(7)
Households’ choices of the measure of traders (n) solves the following
h′(1− n) = αN
N − σ
[
lu′(cb)(qb − ψ(qb)
ψ′(qb)
) + (1− l)u′(cm)(qm − ψ(qm)
ψ′(qm)
)
]
(8)
The envelope conditions for m+1, b+1 are
m+1 :
γ
β
ωm−1 = ωm +
αNl
N − σλ
b +
αN(1− l)
N − σ λ
m (9)
b+1 :
γ
β
ωb−1 = ωm +
αNl
N − σλ
b (10)
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At the end of each period, each unit of bond is redeemed for a unit of money, therefore
the value of an asset is the value of money in the following period plus the liquidity services
that the asset provides, accounting for discounting and inflation. Money provides liquidity
services in all types of trades, and bond is used in certain types of trade. Expressions 9 and
10 show that money has a liquidity premium over bond.
2.6 Definition of the equilibrium
Definition 1 An equilibrium is households’ choices (ci∈{m,b}, qi∈{m,b}, xi∈{m,b}, n,m−1, bs+1, b
l
+1),
the value function (v(m, b)), shadow value of assets (ωm, ωb), asset price (s), and other HHs’
(households’) choices. such that
1. Given bond price (s), and choices of others, household choices are optimal (1)
2. The choices and shadow prices are the same across households, i.e., qi = Qi, xi =
X i, n = N,ωi = Ωi
3. Bonds market clear (b = B)
4. Positive and finite values of assets (0 < ω <∞)
5. Stationarity
2.7 Welfare analysis
The envelope conditions show that the only point at which all of the constraints are
non-binding is where γ = β. Let’s call the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint of a money
trade λm and similarly the Lagrange multiplier on a constraint of a bond and money trade
λb.
Lemma 1 At Friedman rule (γ = β), λm = λb = 0. For γ > β ∃i ∈ {m, b} such that
λi > 0.
In order to study open-market operations, let’s define the ratio of stock of bonds to stock
of money as
z =
B
M
The central bank implements policies by changing the inflation rate (γ) and relative
supply of assets (z). Changes in z are the effects of open-market operations. Open-market
purchase (sale) of bonds decreases (increases) z.
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I define the welfare function as the utility function of a representative household
w = u(cb)− αNlψ(Qb) + u(cm)− αN(1− l)ψ(Qm) (11)
By using the above measure of welfare, I can study the welfare effects of policies. We have
4 types of equilibrium based on the set of binding liquidity constraints. The only point at
which all of the liquidity constraints are non-binding is at the Friedman rule. The Friedman
rule is shown to be optimal in a wide variety of models. As the next theorem shows, the
Friedman rule is optimal in this framework.
Theorem 2 The Friedman rule is optimal.
Since buyers’ bargaining power is 1, households send too many buyers compared to
planner’s choice. Increasing γ punishes unmatched buyers and the representative households.
On the other hand, inflation decreases the amount of goods in each trade. The former effect
is known as the extensive margin of trade, and the latter is known as the intensive margin of
trade. Both intensive margin (q) and extensive margin (n) decrease with inflation (γ). The
planner chooses the lowest possible level for γ to maximize welfare. Therefore, the Friedman
rule is optimal.
Based on the set of liquidity constraints that are binding, we can have 4 types of equilibria.
As shown before, an equilibrium where both of the liquidity constraints are non-binding can
only happen at the Friedman rule and this equilibrium is efficient. In the appendix, I have
characterized different types of equilibria and proved the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Open-market operations can only have welfare effects when both of the liquidity
constraints are binding. The properties of the equilibrium are shown in table 1.
Table 1: Different types of equilibria for a 2-asset economy
Case λm λb s ∂W
∂z
I + 0 β
γ
0
II 0 + 1 0
III + + β
γ
< s < 1 +,−
IV 0 0 1 0
The proof of the theorem is in appendix A. According to theorem 3, marginal open market
operations may have real effects when we have a type III equilibrium. In the literature on
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monetary economics and policy, liquidity traps are mostly associated with the Friedman
rule (type IV equilibrium where γ = β). Williamson (2011) studies liquidity traps in cases
where the economy is away from the Friedman rule and when the real interest rate is zero.
In this paper, we can have properties of the liquidity trap equilibrium even when the real
interest rate is positive. In an equilibrium where only the money constraint is binding (Case
I), open-market operations have no real effects on the economy and the real interest rate is
positive (γ < s = β
γ
). In this case, marginal open-market operations do not have real effects
on the economy.
2.8 Numerical example
Using the following functional forms and parameters, I simulate the model. The calcula-
tions of the different types of equilibria are in the appendix and the results of the simulation
are reported in figures 3 and 4:
u(c) = log(c); ψ(q) =
q2
2
; h(n) = 2a(n)1/2
Lemma 2 shows the criteria for the existence of the equilibrium.
Lemma 2 If a
(1−N)1/2 = N − σ has a solution for N , an equilibrium exists.
The proof is in the appendix.
Table 2 shows the properties of the equilibrium for different amounts of the liquidity
parameter (l).
Table 2: Properties of the equilibrium for a 2-asset economy
Case λm λb Criteria
I + 0 l > l =
( γ
β
−1)(N−σ)+αN
(2+z)αN
II 0 + l < l =
αN−( γ
β
−1)(N−σ)(1+z)
αN(2+z)
III + + l ≤ l ≤ l
IV11 0 0 N/A
These properties are shown in appendix B. Figure 3 shows the range of parameters for
different types of equilibria. For high enough values of l, the liquidity constraint for money
binds and the constraint on trade with bond is slack. For low enough l, the constraint on
bond binds and for l < l < l both of the constraints are binding.
As I have proven in theorem 3, increasing z will only affect welfare when we are in type III
equilibrium with both liquidity constraints binding. Figure 4 shows the welfare properties
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Figure 3: Range of parameters for different types of equilibrium for a 2-asset economy
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of the equilibrium for values of l that cause both liquidity constraints binding (type III
equilibrium). As shown in figure 4, for each inflation rate there exists an optimal level of
bond supply (z) that maximizes welfare.
Figure 4: Welfare effects of open-market operations
2.8.1 The case for legal restrictions on trading with bond
As shown in figure 4, in a type II equilibrium, increasing z from zero increases the overall
welfare. Similar to the argument in Shi (2008), an increase in z can be interpreted as
imposing legal restrictions on trade with bonds. An economy with zero supply of bond is a
pure monetary economy. An increase in z from zero represents imposing legal restrictions
on trades with bonds. As figure 4 shows, this can improve welfare for a range of parameters.
Contrary to the argument in Shi (2008), the argument here is not based on parameters
in the utility function. Shi (2008) assumes that agents can use bond to trade certain types
of goods that yield a higher utility when consumed. Here, consumption of different goods
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yield the same amount of utility.
3 Model with 3 assets
In this section, I add a third asset to the model. This extension of the model allows me
to study the effects of a change in the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet on the
real economy. All three assets provide liquidity services, and, similar to the previous section,
money is the most liquid asset in the economy. I call the least liquid asset in the economy
“long-term bond” and the other asset “short-term bond.” The matching shock works as
follows:
• Shock n: With probability l, agents can trade with money and short term bond and
long term bond
• Shock s: With probability k, agents can trade with money and short term bond
• Shock l: With probability 1− l − k, agents can only trade with money
In each trade buyers make take-it-or-leave-it offers on the amount of goods qi∈{n,s,l} and
the portfolio of assets to be traded for goods xi∈{n,s,l}. Note that the portfolio of assets could
be a combination of money, short-term bond, and long-term bond depending on the type of
trade/shock.
Households solve the following maximization problem:
v(m, bl, bs) = max
ci∈{n,s,l},qi∈{n,s,l},xi∈{n,s,l},n,m−1,bs−1,b
l
+1
{u(cl)− αN(1− l − k)ψ(Ql)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Money trade
+ u(cs)− αNkψ(Qs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Money+short term bond
+ u(cn)− αNlψ(Qn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Money+short term+long term bond
+h(1− n) + βv(m−1, bl+1, bs+1)} (12)
cn =
αN
(N − σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Matching rate
(n− σ)lqn
cs =
αN(n− σ)k
(N − σ) qs
cl =
αN(n− σ)(1− k − l)
(N − σ) ql
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In each type of trade, buyers are constrained by the portfolio of assets that they have:
xn ≤ m+ bl + bs
n− σ (13)
xs ≤ m+ bs
n− σ (14)
xl ≤ m
n− σ (15)
Let’s define ωi i ∈ {m, bs, bl} as the marginal value of assets
ωm =
β
γ
∂
∂m+1
v(m, bl, bs)
ωbs =
β
γ
∂
∂bs+1
v(m, bl, bs)
ωbl =
β
γ
∂
∂bl+1
v(m, bl, bl)
Since buyers have all the bargaining power, the offer sets sellers’ surplus to 0. Thus, the
participation constraint is:
xi = ψ(qi)/Ωm i ∈ {l, s, n} (16)
Households face the following law of motion for assets
(m−1 + sl+1b
l
+1 + s
s
+1b
s
+1 + T−1)γ =
m+ bl + bs + αNlX
n + αNkXs + αN(1− k − l)X l︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sellers’ assets
−αN(n− σ)
N − σ lx
n − αN(n− σ)
N − σ kx
s − αN(n− σ)
N − σ (1− l − k)x
l︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buyers’ assets
(17)
3.1 Optimal choices
The first order condition for qi is
u′(ci) = (ωm + λi)
ψ′(qi)
Ω
i ∈ l, s, n (18)
I can solve for bond prices by taking the first order conditions with respect to b+l , b
+
s
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bl+1 : s
l
+1 =
ωbl
ωm
(19)
bs+1 : s
s
+1 =
ωbs
ωm
(20)
The envelope conditions for m+1, b
s
+1, b
l
+1 are
m+1 :
γ
β
ω−1m = ωm +
αNl
N − σλ
n +
αNk
N − σλ
s +
αN(1− l − k)
N − σ λ
l (21)
bs+1 :
γ
β
ω−1bs = ωm +
αNl
N − σλ
n +
αNk
N − σλ
s (22)
bl+1 :
γ
β
ω−1bl = ωm +
αNl
N − σλ
n (23)
At the end of each period, each asset is redeemed for a unit of money, therefore the value
of an asset is the value of money in the next period plus the transaction services of each asset
accounting for discounting and inflation. Money provides transaction service in all types of
trades, but bonds are used as medium of exchange in certain types of trade. Similar to the
2-asset economy, the Friedman rule (γ = β) is optimal. Here, the central bank has 3 policy
variables: money growth rate (γ), long-term bond supply (zl =
Bl
M
), and short-term bond
supply (zs =
Bs
M
).
In order to study the different equilibria and welfare effects of policy, I will focus on the
log-utility and quadratic cost functions
u(c) = log(c)
ψ(q) = q2/2
Lemma 3 With u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2, N = n is the same for different cases of
equilibrium. An equilibrium exists if h′(1−N) = 3
2(N−σ) has a real solution for N .
The lemma is proven in appendix C. With log-utility and quadratic cost functions, the
first order condition for n becomes h′(1−N) = 3
2(N−σ) in all of the cases. These functional
forms shut down variations in the extensive margin of trade. The proof to this lemma is
provided in the appendix.
In the next theorem, I characterize these different types of equilibrium
Theorem 4 Eight types of equilibrium exist, all of which have different sets of binding liq-
uidity constraints, as defined in table ??.
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Table 3: Different types of equilibria for the 3-asset economy
I II III IV V VI VII IIX
λn + 0 + + 0 0 + 0
λs 0 + + 0 0 + + 0
λl + + 0 0 + 0 + 0
The properties of these equilibriums are summarized in table 4.
Table 4: Properties of the equilibrium for the 3-asset economy
Case Prices ∂qi
∂zi
∂W
∂zi
I β/γ < sl = ss < 1
∂qs
∂zi
= 0 ∂qn
∂zi
> 0 ∂ql
∂zi
< 0 ∂W
∂zi
>=< 0
II sl = β/γ < ss < 1
∂qn
∂zl
= 0 ∂ql
∂zs
< 0 ∂qs
∂zs
>=< 0 ∂W
∂zl
= 0 ∂W
∂zs
>=< 0
III β/γ < sl < ss = 1
∂ql
∂zi
= 0 ∂qs
∂zs
> 0 ∂qs
∂zl
< 0 ∂qn
∂zi
>=< 0 ∂W
∂zi
>=< 0
IV sl = ss = 1 0 0
V sl = ss = β/γ < 1 0 0
VI sl = β/γ < ss = 1 0 0
VII β/γ < sl < ss < 1
∂qj
∂zi
>=< 0 ∂W
∂zi
>=< 0
IIX12 sl = ss = 1 0 0
The proof for the above theorem is provided in appendix C. As the theorem shows, in
equilibriums with at least two binding liquidity constraints, there exists a set of parameters
that indicate that open-market operations affect welfare. In these cases, replacing less liquid
bonds in household portfolios with liquid money would increase the intensive margin of trade
and welfare13.
Table 4 also shows that a policy of changing the relative supply of bonds while keeping
the size of the central bank’s balance sheet constant can affect overall welfare when we have
a type II or VII equilibrium. Credit easing can be implemented by changing the relative
supply of bonds while the following relationship holds
sldzl + ssdzs = 0
The above relationship allows the central bank to keep the size of its balance sheet constant14.
13Note that the extensive margin of trade remains constant with these specific functional forms.
14An example of a policy of credit easing in a type II equilibrium is
β
γ
dzl + sldzs = 0
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Figures 5, 6, and 7 show different types of equilibria for different bond supply (zs, zl) and
inflation rates (γ).
Figure 5: Range of parameters for different types of equilibrium for the 3-asset economy
(zs = zl = 0.7)
4 Conclusion
Adding illiquid nominal bonds to a microfounded model of monetary economy allows
me to study the welfare effects of central bank’s asset purchase programs. I show that the
central bank can change the overall liquidity and welfare in the economy by changing the
relative supply of assets with different liquidity characteristics. My model also enables me
to study the welfare effects of a restriction on trade with government bonds. I show that in
a non-empty set of parameters restricting trade with government bonds can affect welfare.
This policy has real effects on the economy and the central bank keeps the size of its balance sheet constant.
18
Figure 6: Range of parameters for different types of equilibrium for the 3-asset economy
(zs = 2.7, zl = 0.7)
A liquidity trap can exist away from the Friedman rule and with a positive real interest rate.
19
Figure 7: Range of parameters for different types of equilibrium for the 3-asset economy
(zs = 0.7, zl = 2.7)
Appendix
A The 2-asset economy
I characterize 3 cases of the equilibria based on the set of liquidity constraints that are
binding. In all of these cases at least one of the constraints are binding. The case where
none of them are binding only happens at the Friedman rule, and it is shown to be efficient.
Case I: λm > 0 and λb = 0
The first order conditions are
u′(cb) = ψ′(qb)
u′(cm) = ψ′(qm) +
ψ′(qm)
Ωm
λm
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I can rewrite the above equation as
λm = (
u′(cm)
ψ(qb)
− 1)Ωm
Envelope condition gives
γ
β
ωm−1 = ω
m +
αN(1− l)
N − σ
[
(
u′(cm)
ψ′(qm)
− 1)Ωm
]
By applying stationarity, I can write the envelope as
γ
β
− 1 = αN(1− l)
N − σ [
u′(cm)
ψ′(qm)
− 1]
The price for nominal bond is
s =
ωb
ωm
=
β
γ
Case II: λm = 0 and λb > 0
The first order conditions are
u′(cm) = ψ′(qm)
λb = (
u′(cb)
ψ(qb)
− 1)Ωb
Envelope condition gives
γ
β
ωm−1 = ω
m +
αNl
N − σ
[
(
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1)Ωb
]
The price for the nominal bond is 1. By applying stationarity, I can write the envelope
as
γ
β
− 1 = αNl
N − σ [
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1]
It is straightforward to see that changing z would not affect households’ decision and
welfare when at least one of the liquidity constraints is not binding.
Case III: λm > 0 and λb > 0
The first order conditions are
λm = (
u′(cm)
ψ′(qm)
− 1)Ωm
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λb = (
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1)Ωm
Envelope conditions give
γ
β
ωm−1 = ω
m +
αNl
N − σ
[(
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1
)
Ωm
]
+
αN(1− l)
N − σ
[(
u′(cm)
ψ′(qm)
− 1
)
Ωm
]
γ
β
ωm−1 = ω
m +
αNl
N − σ
[(
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1
)
Ωm
]
By applying stationarity, I can write the envelope conditions as
γ
β
s− 1 = αNl
N − σ
[
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1
]
γ
β
− 1 = αNl
N − σ
[
u′(cb)
ψ′(qb)
− 1
]
+
αN(1− l)
N − σ
[
u′(cm)
ψ′(qm)
− 1
]
It is straightforward to see that changing z affects the decisions of households and has
real effects on the economy.
B Numerical example for the 2-asset economy
I solve the model for the following functional forms
u(c) = log(c)
ψ(q) =
q2
2
h(n) = 2an1/2
Now I solve the model for 3 different cases of liquidity constrains
Case I:
qb =
1
(αNl)1/2
qm =
1(
( γ
β
− 1)(N − σ) + αN(1− l)
)1/2
a
(1−N)1/2 = N − σ
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By using the constraints it is straightforward to show that this equilibrium happens for
high enough l
l > l =
( γ
β
− 1)(N − σ) + αN
(2 + z)αN
Case II:
qm =
1
(αN(1− l))1/2
qb =
1(
( γ
β
− 1)(N − σ) + αNl
)1/2
a
(1−N)1/2 = N − σ
By using the constraints it is straightforward to show that this equilibrium happens for
low enough l
l < l =
αN − ( γ
β
− 1)(N − σ)(1 + z)
αN(2 + z)
Case III:
qm =
1(
γ
β
(1− s)(N − σ) + αN(1− l)
)1/2
qb =
1(
( γ
β
s− 1)(N − σ) + αNl
)1/2
s =
γ
β
(N − σ) + αN(1− l) + (1 + z)(N − σ − αNl)
γ
β
(2 + z)(N − σ)
a
(1−N)1/2 = N − σ
C The 3-asset economy
Define
ζ(qi) = ψ
′(qi)qi − ψ(qi) i ∈ {l, s, n}
In what follows I solve the problem in different cases of equilibrium.
Cases:
I: λs = 0 < λn, λl
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From the envelope conditions it follows
ss = sl < 1
The first order conditions are
u′(cs) = ψ′(qs)
γ
β
ss − 1 = αNl
N − σ [
u′(cn)
ψ′(qn)
− 1]
γ
β
(1− ss) = αN(1− l − k)
N − σ [
u′(cl)
ψ′(ql)
− 1]
h′(1−N) = (γ
β
ss − 1 + αNl
N − σ )ζ(qn) +
αNk
N − σζ(qs) +
(
γ
β
(1− ss) + αN(1− k − l)
N − σ )ζ(ql)
Solution for u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2
1/q2s = αNk
1/q2n = (
γ
β
ss − 1)(N − σ) + αNl
1/q2l =
γ
β
(1− ss)(N − σ) + αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
The solution to the above equations is
ss =
1 + βαN(1−l−k)
γ(N−σ) + β/γ(1 + zs + zl)(1− αNlN−σ )
2 + zl + zs
1/q2n =
αN(1− l − k) + γ/β(N − σ) + αNl − (1 + zl + zs)(N − σ)
2 + zl + zs
1/q2l =
1 + zl + zs
2 + zl + zs
(αN(1− k) + (N − σ)(γ/β − 1))
Using some algebra I can solve for the criteria for this equilibrium
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1 + zl + zs
(1 + zs)(2 + zl + zs) + (1 + zl + zs)
(1 +
N − σ
αN
(γ/β − 1)) ≤ k
(1 + zl + zs)(1 +
N−σ
αN
(γ/β − (1 + zs + zl)))
(1 + zs)(2 + zl + zs) + (1 + zl + zs)
≤ k
The left hand side of the second equation is greater than the first.
II: λn = 0 < λs, λl
sl = β/γ < ss < 1
u′(cn) = ψ′(qn)
γ
β
ss − 1 = αNk
N − σ [
u′(cs)
ψ′(qs)
− 1]
γ
β
(1− ss) = αN(1− l − k)
N − σ [
u′(cl)
ψ′(ql)
− 1]
h′(1−N) = αNl
N − σζ(qn) + (
γ
β
ss − 1 + αNk
N − σ )ζ(qs) +
(
γ
β
(1− ss) + αN(1− k − l)
N − σ )ζ(ql)
Solution for u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2
1/q2s = (
γ
β
ss − 1)(N − σ) + αNk
1/q2n = αNl
1/q2l =
γ
β
(1− ss)(N − σ) + αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
The solution to the above equations is
ss =
1 + αN(1−l−k)
N−σ β/γ − (αNk − β/γ)(1 + zs)
2 + zs
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1/q2s =
αN(1− l) + (1 + zs)(αNK(1− γ/β(N − σ))− (N − σ))− (N − σ)(γ/β − 1)
2 + zs
1/q2l =
1 + zs
2 + zs
(γ/β(N − σ)(1− αNk) + αN(1− l − k)− (N − σ))
Using some algebra I can solve for the criteria for this equilibrium
k ≤ ((1 + zs + zl)(2 + zs) + 1 + zs)l − (1 + zs)(1−
N−σ
αN
(γ/β − 1)) + (1+zs)2(N−σ)
αN
(1 + zs)2(1− γ/β(N − σ))
(1 + N−σ
αN
(γ/β − 1))(1 + zs)− ((2 + zs)(1 + zl + zs) + (1 + zs)l)
(1 + γ/β(N − σ))(1 + zs) ≤ k
III: λl = 0 < λn, λs
sl < ss = 1
u′(cl) = ψ′(ql)
γ
β
sl − 1 = αNl
N − σ [
u′(cn)
ψ′(qn)
− 1]
γ
β
(1− sl) = αNK
N − σ [
u′(cs)
ψ′(qs)
− 1]
h′(1−N) = αN(1− k − l)
N − σ ζ(ql) + (
γ
β
sl − 1 + αNl
N − σ )ζ(qn) +
(
γ
β
(1− sl) + αNk
N − σ )ζ(qs)
Solution for u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2
1/q2s =
γ
β
(1− ss)(N − σ) + αNk
1/q2n = (
γ
β
ss − 1)(N − σ) + αNl
1/q2l = αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
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And by some algebra
sl =
(1 + zs)(1 +
αNk
N−σβ/γ)− β/γ( αNkN−σ − 1)(1 + zs + zl)
2 + 2zs + zl
1/q2l = γ/β(N − σ) + αNk −
(1 + zs)(γ/β(N − σ) + αNk)− (αNl − (N − σ))(1 + zl + zs)
2 + 2zs + zl
1/q2n =
αN(1 + zs)(k + l)− (N − σ)(1 + zl + zs)(γ/β − 1)
2 + 2zs + zl
Using some algebra I can solve for the criteria for this equilibrium
k + l ≤ (2 + 2zs + zl) +
N−σ
αN
(1 + zs + zl)
2(γ/β − 1)
(1 + zs)(1 + zs + zl) + (2 + 2zs + zl)
((1 + zs)(1 + zs + zl) + 2 + 2zs + zl)k + (−(1 + zs)(1 + zs + zl) + 2 + 2zs + zl)l ≤
2 + 2zs + zl − (1 + zs + zl)(1 + zs)(N − σ
αN
(γ/β + 1))
IV: λs = λl = 0 < λn
sl = ss = 1
u′(cl) = ψ′(ql)
u′(cs) = ψ′(qs)
γ
β
− 1 = αNl
N − σ [
u′(cn)
ψ′(qn)
− 1]
h′(1−N) = αNk
N − σζ(qs) + (
γ
β
− 1 + αNl
N − σ )ζ(qn) +
αN(1− k − l)
N − σ ζ(ql)
As the above equations show, marginal open-market operations (small changes in zs and
zl) do not change the real decisions of the households and welfare. Solution for u(c) = log(c)
and ψ(q) = q2/2
1/q2s = αNk
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1/q2n = (
γ
β
− 1)(N − σ) + αNl
1/q2l = αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
Using some algebra I can solve for the criteria for this equilibrium
(γ/β − 1)(N − σ
αN
)(1 + zs + zl) ≤ (1 + zs)k − (1 + zs + zl)l
(2 + zs + zl)l + k ≤ 1− (1 + zs + zl)(γ/β − 1)N − σ
αN
V: λs = λn = 0 < λl
sl = ss = β/γ < 1
u′(cn) = ψ′(qn)
u′(cs) = ψ′(qs)
γ
β
− 1 = αN(1− k − l)
N − σ [
u′(cn)
ψ′(qn)
− 1]
h′(1−N) = αNl
N − σζ(qn) + (
γ
β
− 1 + αN(1− k − l)
N − σ )ζ(ql) +
αNk
N − σζ(qs)
As the above equations show, marginal open-market operations (small changes in zs and zl)
do not change the real decisions of the households and welfare.
Solution for u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2
1/q2s = αNk
1/q2n = αNl
1/q2l = (
γ
β
− 1)(N − σ) + αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
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Using some algebra I can solve for the criteria for this equilibrium:
1 + (γ/β − 1)N − σ
αN
≤ (2 + zs + zl)l + k
1 + (γ/β − 1)(N − σ
αN
) ≤ (2 + zs)k + l
VI: λn = λl = 0 < λs
sl = β/γ < ss = 1
u′(cn) = ψ′(qn)
u′(cl) = ψ′(ql)
γ
β
− 1 = αNk
N − σ [
u′(cs)
ψ′(qs)
− 1]
h′(1−N) = αNl
N − σζ(qn) + (
γ
β
− 1 + αNk
N − σ )ζ(qs) +
αN(1− k − l)
N − σ ζ(ql)
As the above equations show, marginal open-market operations (small changes in zs and zl)
do not change the real decisions of the households and welfare.
Solution for u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2:
1/q2s = (
γ
β
− 1)(N − σ) + αNk
1/q2n = αNl
1/q2l = αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
Using some algebra I can solve for the criteria for this equilibrium:
(2 + zs)k + l ≤ 1− (γ/β − 1)N − σ
αN
(1 + zs)
(γ/β − 1)(N − σ
αN
)(1 + zs) ≤ (1 + zs + zl)l − (1 + zs)k
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VII: 0 < λs, λl, λn
sl < ss < 1
γ
β
sl − 1 = αNl
N − σ [
u′(cn)
ψ′(qn)
− 1]
γ
β
(ss − sl) = αNk
N − σ [
u′(cs)
ψ′(qs)
− 1]
γ
β
(1− ss) = αN(1− l − k)
N − σ [
u′(cl)
ψ′(ql)
− 1]
h′(1−N) = (γ
β
sl − 1 + αNl
N − σ )ζ(qn) + (
γ
β
(ss − sl) + αNk
N − σ )ζ(qs) +
(
γ
β
(1− ss) + αN(1− l − k)
N − σ )ζ(ql)
Solution for u(c) = log(c) and ψ(q) = q2/2:
1/q2s =
γ
β
(ss − sl)(N − σ) + αNk
1/q2n = (
γ
β
sl − 1)(N − σ) + αNl
1/q2l =
γ
β
(1− ss)(N − σ) + αN(1− l − k)
h′(1−N) = 3
2(N − σ)
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